Internal versus External Reference Perspective in Efficiency Wage Models Reconsidered by Koskela, Erkki & Schöb, Ronnie
öMmföäflsäafaäsflassflassflas
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
Discussion Papers
Internal versus External Reference
Perspective in Efficiency Wage Models
Reconsidered
Erkki Koskela
University of Helsinki, RUESG and HECER
and
Ronnie Schöb
Otto-von-Guericke-University Magdeburg
Discussion Paper No.107
May 2006
ISSN 1795-0562
HECER – Helsinki Center of Economic Research, P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7),
FI-00014 University of Helsinki, FINLAND, Tel +358-9-191-28780, Fax +358-9-
191-28781, E-mail info-hecer@helsinki.fi, Internet www.hecer.fi
HECER
Discussion Paper No. 107
 Internal versus External Reference Perspective
in Efficiency Wage Models Reconsidered*
Abstract
Danthine and Kurmann (2006) show that efficiency wage models may generate
wage rigidity when workers not only compare their wage with outside wages but
also with and internal reference wage that depends on the firm’s ability to pay. We
modify their framework in a way that makes the external reference wage
component consistent with assumptions normally made. With this generalization
we show that although the relative weight of the internal reference wage is decisive
for the degree of wage rigidity, the efficiency model already exhibit wage rigidity
when this weight is rather modest.
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11. Introduction
In a recent paper, Danthine and Kurmann (2006) show that conventional formulations of
efficiency wage models fail to generate wage rigidity in general equilibrium and are thus
contrary to empirical findings. Negative shocks that shift labor demand inwards may induce
workers to work harder, which, according to theory, would lead employers to cut wages.
Empirical evidence, however, shows that this is hardly the case (see Blinder and Choi 1990,
Bewley 1999, Agell and Bennmarker 2003). To provide a theoretical analysis that is more
in line with empirical findings, Danthine and Kurmann (2006) present a modified version
of the standard efficiency wage model, in which they also make the reference wage
“dependent on firm-internal measures of earnings per unit of labor”. Their version of the
efficiency model exhibits a high degree of wage rigidity in general equilibrium.
In the way they model the reference wage, however, they effectively exclude
important general equilibrium considerations and therefore limit the relevance of their
model. We therefore generalize their model by consistently redefining the external part of
the reference wage by taking into account the possibility of finding employment elsewhere.
We show that, even in this generalized framework, wage rigidity is likely to occur even
under the circumstances where the internal reference wage plays only a minor part in the
workers’ effort determination.
2. Model
Our framework is closely related to the model in Danthine and Kurmann (2006) – DK in
what follows. Firms use effective labor en  to produce output y, with e denoting work effort
and n the level of labor input. The production function is ?)(enAy ?  with 10 ??? , where
2A  represents the level of technology and can be interpreted as a shift parameter that
reflects exogenous shocks. We consider homogenous workers who are willing to provide
effort according to the effort function ?? ???? rwwaae 10 , with 0a , 1a  and 10 ?? ?  being
positive constants (cf. Akerlof 1982, p. 561). The firm’s wage is denoted by w, and the
reference wage by rw .
According to DK, “workers appreciate their salary offer in light of the firm’s output
per employee ny /  and of their reservation wage b.” (DK, p. 280) They thus define the
reference wage with which workers compare their wage when deciding on their effort as
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?
?? 1 ,
where 10 ?? v  is assumed to be exogenous. The first term represents the maximum wage
at which the entire rent is attributed to the worker. The second term denotes the minimum
wage below which the worker would prefer the outside option. The first term thus
represents the internal reference wage determined by the firm while the latter depends on
external parameters. DK define this outside option as staying at home and collecting
unemployment benefit payment .b  The assumption that unemployment is the only outside
option, however, is very restrictive and is inconsistent with the usual interpretation of
external options as used by Akerlof (1982).
Defining the external option in the usual way, component b should depend on the
wage workers obtain if rehired by another firm, on the probability of reemployment, and on
the level of unemployment benefits. Using the same functional form as suggested by
Akerlof (1982, p. 561) for the external reference wage component and denoting w  as the
equilibrium wage, n  as the equilibrium employment rate, and b  as the unemployment
3benefit payment, we can write the external component as a geometric average nnbwb ?? 1
so that the reference wage can be expressed as
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It turns out that most of the analysis by DK is not affected by this modification. In
particular, the modified Solow condition (9) newe ,,1 ?? ?? , where ewewwe /, ??  and
enenne /, ?? , remains valid. If the internal reference wage is relevant, a marginal wage
increase reduces employment, which in turn increases the reference wage. “Thus, ceteris
paribus, the last wage increase warranted in the external reference case would not pay for
itself in the internal reference context.” (DK, p. 281).
While the wage-setting curve in the DK model does not depend on aggregate
employment anymore, the wage curve in our setting does. Under the assumption of a
constant benefit replacement ratio wb ?? , ,10 ?? ?  applying the symmetric equilibrium
conditions ww ? , nn ? , the modified Solow condition, and the reference wage (2) gives
the optimal effort level
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? . When we allow for this, the production function
implies that the modified aggregate wage-setting curve is then given by
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 is a constant. From this, it follows that the
general equilibrium wage elasticity with respect to employment cannot be signed
unambiguously anymore because we have
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Condition (4) indicates that the degree of wage rigidity depends on the weight of the
internal reference v . The limiting case 0?v  represents the standard efficiency wage model
with high variability of the efficiency wage. In this case, the reference wage reduces to
nn
r bww
?? 1  and the wage elasticity becomes unambiguously positive (see DK, equation
(13)). For the parameters 9.?n  and 65.?? , DK calculated a high elasticity of 3.88, i.e. the
wage reaction is four times as high as the employment adjustment. With the further
assumption of a labor share of 31??  in the production function, we obtain the following
elasticities for our modified reference wage:
v 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
? 3.16 1.22 0.57 0.25 0.05 ?0.07 ?0.17 ?0.24 ?0.29
When the internal reference becomes more important (larger than .5377 in our example),
the slope of the wage-setting curve becomes negative. In the interval ]9,.5[.?v , the model
already exhibits a relative low wage elasticity and thus relatively strong wage rigidity. As
condition (4) further shows, both an increase in either the replacement ratio ?  or the
unemployment rate n?1  leads to lower values of the wage elasticity since this puts more
weight within the external reference wage component on  income when unemployed.
3. Conclusion
We have modified the model of Danthine and Kurmann (2006) by making their internal
reference wage definition consistent with the standard assumption about the external
5reference wage component. With this generalization, we have shown that, although the
relative weight of the internal reference wage is decisive for the degree of wage rigidity, the
efficiency wage model already exhibits wage rigidity when this weight is only modest.
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